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Andy Inch, Lucie Laurian and Clare Mouat. 
 
Urban development can often seem an irresistible force. The imperatives of development are deeply 
inscribed in the DNA of liberal capitalist societies. As well as realising profit-making opportunities for the 
private sector, urban change is a mechanism for (re)generating neighbourhoods, for providing public 
goods such as waste management, energy generation or public housing.  
The state may seek to mediate, ameliorate or shape development forces, thereby alleviating tensions and 
inequalities between divergent publics, and establishing claims to a greater public interest in certain 
forms of change. As it does so, state-support may make development seem even more irresistible, 
especially if space for political challenge closes down. Yet, the seemingly irresistible force often summons 
seemingly immoveable subjects of resistance: namely citizens and campaign groups who stand against 
planned changes and declare: ‘we shall not be moved.’  Sometimes resistance dissolves with meaningful 
public input and project improvements; sometimes it remains steadfast in its opposition. 
The ‘immovable subjects’ who resist are mobilized by concerns to which we may be more or less 
sympathetic: perceived threats to valued place attachments and identities; outrage at environmental 
injustices; the desire to defend private property rights; racism and anti-immigrant sentiment. Whether 
singly or collectively, these claims and their nuanced interpretations can motivate intractable and 
sometimes violent opposition. 
The starting point for this Interface is a view that contemporary planning theory and practice continue to 
struggle with the complex and ambiguous political and ethical challenges posed by the forms of 
opposition that coalesce around state-mediated urban development. How can, and how should, the 
essential injustices (Davy, 1997) that planning and development generate be managed and distributed? 
Can meaningful engagement with opposition address tensions and contribute to better outcomes? The 
implications for representative democracy and collaborative governance are no less profound: from the 
local to the global, resistance and opposition are central but also often disruptive to the democratic 
exercise of power. 
Following a roundtable discussion session held at the ACSP annual conference in Houston in November 
2015, this interface seeks to further explore immovable opposition to planning and development: how it 
should be understood as an increasingly prevalent feature of many late capitalist societies; how it 
challenges ideals of consensus building, win-win solutions and negotiated agreements; and how planning 
theory and practice might respond to the challenges it poses to our views of planning and public action.  
To stimulate a genuine and multi-faceted exchange, we developed an innovative written dialogue 
process. We engaged seven contributors with academic, activist, and/or practitioner experiences: Ruth 
Davies (Consultant Social Planner, Victoria, Australia), Ben Davy (TU Dortmund University), Lucie Laurian 
(University of Iowa), Crystal Legacy (RMIT, Australia), Andy Inch (University of Lisbon), Clare Mouat 
(University of Western Australia), and Clare Symonds (Planning Democracy, Scotland). 
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Each participant answered a set of questions in turn (available in full in Appendix) building on his/her 
practice, research and experience, and considering other participants’ answers to the questions. 
(Participants passed answers around in a staggered sequence so that each would read and respond to 
others’ answers as the process evolved.) The editors (Andy Inch, Clare Mouat, and Lucie Laurian) edited 
the resultant conversation, which was then reviewed and agreed by all contributors prior to publication. 
 
Participants presented many types of planning cases that generate immovable resistance within various 
theoretical frames and considerations. These cases stem from the areas of transport and energy 
infrastructure to housing projects and contemporary political events. It is hoped these experiences 
contribute both practical wisdom from particular places and wider insights that can generate learning and 
further dialogue. 
focused on large infrastructure projects, including 
the proposed East-West Link road tunnel in Melbourne. This project was supported by wide community 
engagement, but faced vociferous local opposition. The underlying reasons for opposition were: anger 
(that local people were not involved in decisions), fear of change, a displacement of anxiety (protestors 
seeking to reduce environmental harms) and self-image (becoming part of a protest group contributes to 
protestors’ sense of self-worth and social identity). They highlighted the particular importance of stories, 
scale, and emotions in opposition movements. 
focused on two situations with divergent ethical implications. In 1984, a hydroelectric 
power plant planned at Hainburg Au (Austria), with government support, caused major opposition from 
environmental activists. The resistance was intense, with about 3,000 environmentalist occupiers, 
activists chaining themselves to trees and blocking bulldozers, and the intervention of hundreds of 
policemen and police helicopters. The opposition challenged the project in court. The Austrian courts 
found the plant not in accordance with the law, and cancelled the project. In this case, opposition helped 
put the project to the test of legality. Planning was about process as much as results: ‘Not only must 
justice be done (to borrow a common law phrase), it must be seen to be done.’ Opponents to the results 
of planning, however, do not always help improve these results. Moreover, they cannot necessarily claim 
the moral high ground. Consider, for example, the criminals who torched refugee camps in Germany in 
2015 and 2016. These criminals could also be described as instances of ‘immovable resistance’. They 
oppose the ‘refugees welcome’ policy of the German government, implemented by the siting of refugee 
camps. Such opposition to immigration operates in the realm of illegal criminal activity and challenges any 
simple understanding of resistance and protest as a good thing in their own right. 
identified several cases of immovable resistance. Indigenous people are 
immovable in their efforts to protect sacred sites and natural elements (e.g., water), most recently at 
Standing Rock in opposition to the Dakota Access Pipeline. In these cases, resistance is immovable 
because one cannot destroy or harm a sacred site ‘just a bit.’ There is no meaningful negotiated solution 
to be found because any damaging activity destroys what is sacred. Other immovable resistance is found 
in Environmental Justice communities in the U.S. South when industry tries to site toxic facilities in the 
already super-polluted ‘Cancer Alley.’ For instance, the Shintech PVC Plant proposed in Convent, 
Louisiana, was successfully opposed in 1995-96. In these cases, the opposition’s stance was ‘No more!’. 
Like Ben, she also considers ethically questionable opposition to changes, in her cases proposals to 
change school districts’ boundaries in the U.S. White families often ‘absolutely’ oppose redistricting 
efforts geared to increase socio-economic and racial diversity in public schools. Opposition has multiple 
rationales, including support for neighborhood schools located within walking/biking distances to homes 
and opposing racial integration, some of which are more palatable than others. 
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discussed resistance to transport projects in Melbourne, Australia. In her 
case, the immoveable subjects of resistance were a class of elected politicians seeking to appease a 
powerful road lobby, and residents disenchanted with public transport options in the suburbs. Opposition 
was rarely couched in simple Not-In-My-Backyard (NIMBY) resistance, but rather as advocacy for 
alternative low-carbon transportation systems. She identifies deficiencies in governance and planning 
process, especially the foregrounding of a confrontational and antagonistic elite who use their political 
power to disrupt a growing consensus to invest in public transport. 
focused on stories collected during their work for the non-
profit Planning Democracy in Scotland. These were typically ‘David and Goliath’ scenarios where citizens 
found themselves battling against major development, including housing, energy and infrastructure 
projects. These large-scale projects created huge anxiety for residents who often sought to protect 
valued land from development, bringing them up against powerful landowners and developers backed by 
a broadly pro-development planning system. In the end, profound power imbalances usually shaped the 
use and development of land, and though wealthy communities are more able to use their resources to 
‘fight’ development, all public voices face a struggle to be heard. Throughout the process, a culture of 
closed-door meetings between developers and public authorities leads to rumours, mistrust and a sense 
for citizens that they are in opposition to ‘the system.’ 
 
—Where do you stand on the issue of opposition and how it should be handled? We are thinking 
here especially of debates between those who advocate agreement-seeking/ consensus-building 
approaches to planning conflicts and those who suggest that this approach, by avoiding conflict, may 
prevent political challenges to established power relations, ‘timely development’ or so-called 
‘progress’. 
—Theoretically and practically, we need to move beyond the conflict/consensus 
binary presented in this question. Particularly because it means we risk missing the ‘vitality’ (Pløger, 
2006) that can come from mutual learning in the face of conflict (which we define here as the promise 
of agonism contra adversarial antagonism). Critics of the ‘post-political’ nature of much contemporary 
planning make this point too. When planners focus on managing contested development by 
championing consensus-based and non-adversarial systems they can defer, displace, and transfer the 
political (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2015: 30). This approach can neglect the mutual learning that 
can come from conflict and overlook important dynamics by focusing on decision-points (such as 
approving or condemning a development proposal). 
In practice, manifestations of immoveable subjects and irresistible forces in Australian development 
often focus around struggles to either broaden participation or streamline procedures for 
development approval. Taylor et al. (2016) assessed the relative odds of successful opposition at State 
of Victoria’s planning tribunal (VCAT) for Melbourne housing development assessments. Their work 
found that attempts to streamline formal opportunities for opponents to be heard often increased 
uncertainty and complexity by encouraging people to seek other means to influence decision-making 
outside of formal processes. 
.—So the conclusion seems similar in theory and practice: attempts to streamline away opposition 
often only lead to it re-emerging in other ways that may be harder to constructively engage? 
—Yes, and planning lawyers have often been effective at limiting grounds for 
effective opposition, whilst communities struggle to focus their opposition on issues that are 
recognised especially across different laws and policies: they do not know how to enter or use the 
system effectively. This allows developers to reduce the need for compromise or accommodation, 
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particularly if that means reduced profits. In these cases, the ‘immovable’ opposition is side-stepped 
using legal processes, leaving communities frustrated. 
— As Ruth and ClareM argue, it is crucial that we avoid setting up a false binary between conflict 
and consensus. In particular because it risks failing to engage with the complexities of context and the 
everyday power dynamics that shape planning processes and moments of decision-making. 
Lois McNay (2014) describes in the book The misguided search for the political that a ‘social 
weightlessness’ arises from a lack of critical engagement with the temporal, spatial, historical and 
cultural specificities that produce the inequalities and power relations that remain hidden by, yet still 
deeply embedded within, contemporary planning processes (p40). McNay’s argument suggests that 
popular theoretical frameworks are limited, including both those that promote consensus-seeking 
deliberation and those that counter by stressing the virtues of conflict and disagreement as a means 
of challenging the existing political order. What these frameworks tend to do is focus on the 
performative dimensions of planning (i.e. how decisions are reached, how conflict is addressed), 
rather than focusing on the underlying conditions that make it possible for some people to engage 
more effectively than others. Opposition may represent an extraordinary moment of conflict directed 
at a planning proposal but the antecedents of that conflict are usually deeply embedded in the 
structures of planning and in the deeply felt experience of planning (by citizens). 
In the case of the East West Link in Melbourne, community resistance was directed at a proposal for a 
big road that would destroy parts of a beloved inner city park and concern over a business case that 
was not made public. Bigger questions about who and what is representing the public interest, how 
and at what scale the public interest is being interpreted, and then from here, who and what is being 
excluded based on this, were fundamental questions that were never openly discussed in a political 
and inclusive arena.  
—In a democracy under the rule of law, opposition is above all a valuable instrument of quality 
control. As long as planners encounter opposition, they may have yet missed opportunities to improve 
their plans by accounting for other voices, other rationalities. Poor planning often results from 
monorationality: accounting only for jobs, but not the environment; looking out only for wealthy 
developers, but not the urban poor; merely considering the interests of property owners, yet 
neglecting the landless. Consensus building (Susskind & Field, 1996; Susskind et al., 1999; Susskind, 
2014), active listening (Forester, 1989 and 2009), collaborative planning (Healey, 1997 and 2003), or 
communicative planning (Innes & Booher, 2015) often help avoid paternalistic and hegemonic 
approaches to monorational planning. A planner who facilitates wise and fair agreements must be 
regarded as an honest broker, not as an instrument of minority control. 
—That assumes planners are in an institutional position to play such a role and/ or have some 
commitment to questioning their own rationalities, doesn’t it? 
—Yes, but any attempt to a more inclusive planning and public participation will fail if planners 
merely enhance their selling strategy without taking opponents as seriously as possible. In this case, 
unrelenting opposition means that planners have abused the spaces of deliberative democracy in 
order to promote not the public interest, but the interests of a few. Personally, I find it difficult to 
identify a point when it is safe to say that planners could refuse to act as honest brokers or mere 
mediators because their opponents have been dishonest, i.e. when planners could tell others that 
they are not welcome to participate. Firebombing homes that were planned under the humanitarian 
goal of welcoming refugees clearly oversteps the line drawn in a democracy under the rule of law.  But 
one person’s terrorist is someone else’s freedom fighter and the meaning of legitimate opposition 
depends a great deal on circumstances that are far beyond the influence of planners. 
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—Some years ago, I researched participatory processes around environmental remediation at 
military and non-military industrial sites in the US. In some cases, debates and conflicts emerged 
around the most appropriate clean-up methods and toxic waste disposal. In a particular case, 
however, participants agreed that a government-proposed clean-up method was the most 
appropriate. Although non-problematic from a planning practice perspective, this case troubled me 
the most. How could I be really certain that participants agreed ‘of their own volition’? How could I 
distinguish this (real) agreement from (1) manipulative co-optation on the part of the agency in charge 
and (2) persuasion of the best argument proposed by experts and scientists in positions of authority? I 
think the difficulty of distinguishing between co-optation and ‘genuine’ agreement (in the absence or 
presence of persuasion) is pivotal to making normative and ethical claims about the value of mediation 
and negotiated agreements. 
If an agreement can only be reached through co-optation or heavy handed persuasion (which needs to 
be defined since persuasion can use a variety of tools from threats to reasonable-sounding scientific 
claims), then immovable opposition seems preferable to a conflict resolution where disadvantaged 
parties risk losing the most. If an agreement can be reached without resorting to manipulative 
techniques, then mediated solutions seem preferable. But again, how do we know? How do we 
determine the heavy-handedness of persuasive arguments? In situations with major information, 
knowledge or power imbalances (particularly in access to scientific and legal advice, economic 
resources and political influence), it is reasonable to assume that co-optation may play out - but it is 
not necessarily the case. In situations with major power imbalances and major threats to persons 
and/or communities, it is also difficult to imagine how negotiated agreements could be reached in 
anything like ideal Habermasian
1
 conditions. I would propose that conflict resolution is probably 
ethically superior in cases where knowledge and power are balanced fairly, and probably ethically 
dubious in cases of great knowledge and power imbalances. 
—In our experience people are not always immovable. But for many of the 
‘opponents’ we meet, we’d say little in their previous life had really prepared them for the experience 
of trying to influence planning decisions. As Ruth and ClareM point out, the shock of finding a system 
unwilling to recognise their concerns, or even to listen carefully to them, is often considerable and can 
harden people’s resolve.  
Those who simply fear change may respond to better involvement in decisions, mediation and 
processes designed to talk through what is involved in negotiating an agreement. However, more 
politically and ideologically motivated opponents, or those who stand to lose things they value highly, 
are probably, and often rightly, far less movable. 
Currently we are exploring a case study where a developer has apparently really listened to a 
community’s concerns and spoken directly with them. But such enlightened practices seem relatively 
rare in Scotland where a pro-development system usually enables developers to drive through 
planning applications without the bother, and where planners don’t seem all that keen to question 
their mono-rationality! 
.—And such practices often seem to exacerbate conflict or vilify it, rather than offering a way to learn 
from it, to improve decisions or understand concerns 
																																								 																				
1
 As referenced further below, much communicative planning theory has drawn on Jurgen Habermas’ formulation 
of an ‘ideal speech situation’, where the force of the better argument prevails through rational deliberation. 
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—For us, another interesting thing about opposition to development is that it often 
seems to touch or uncover a feeling that there are real limitations to how much of the world should be 
treated as a commodity.  As the environmentalist Paul Kingsnorth (2016) argued recently in The 
Guardian: 
‘To us, the wild places around us (if there are any left) are ‘resources’ to be utilised. We 
argue constantly about how best to use them—should we log this forest, or turn it into a 
national park?—but only the bravest or the most foolish would suggest that this might not 
be our decision to make. To modern people, the world we walk through is not an animal, a 
being, a living presence; it is a machine, and our task is to learn how it works, the better to 
use it for our own ends.’ 
Many people feel this unease, perhaps even without realising what it is. They are attempting to 
protect a living being, a world they feel is being irreversibly destroyed. This brings emotion into the 
equation and planning with its technocratic and legal language frequently does not take this into 
account as a ‘material consideration’ (the term for a legally valid planning argument in Scotland). As 
Ruth and ClareM say, it denies people the chance to explore what is important to them, perhaps even 
on a deeper level than they can readily express. This kind of closing down of debate can be profoundly 
alienating, and limits what could be an important opportunity to explore how we relate to the 
environments we live in. 
 —Maybe, the question should be less concerned with whether conflict or consensus based 
approaches are right, and more about how and where to enable people to explore what matters to 
them about how places change, and what stops this from happening?  
Q  2  
—Planning frequently requires ‘situated ethical judgements’ and distributing ‘essential injustices.’ 
How can we determine when resistance is justified, and when imposition is justified to overcome 
resistance? 
—Rational planning, with its cost-benefit analyses and EIAs, is perceived as an impartial decision-
making guide because it seemingly maximizes benefits. The courts recognize cost-benefit analyses and 
EIAs. In this context, resistance is often framed as ‘unreasonable.’ 
Outside of these ‘rational’ processes, planning decisions tend to be guided by political elites. I think 
this erodes the bureaucratic power of planners. Unlike political power, bureaucratic power could hold 
decisions accountable to a wider view of ethics and to the public good. In Australian transport 
planning, we see a fracture between urban and transport planning, and between bureaucratic 
planners and political elites. Ethical judgements are disjointed and planning systems fail to mediate 
politics and serve the public good. 
—This is really interesting! In Australia and New Zealand, I hear that this is how you think about 
bureaucrats (quite positive!). The Dutch similarly refer to civil servants as real servants to civil society. 
In the US, it’s quite different. We tend to see bureaucrats as the peons of politicians, approving all the 
permits politicians and city attorneys tell them to. We tend to think of politicians as more accountable 
to the public than career bureaucrats because they will seek re-election.  
—I think the best way to deal with essential injustice (Davy, 1997) is through a combination of 
democratic decision-making (to determine if projects serve the public interest) and the rule of law 
(which protects human and individual rights). In the hydroelectric power plant case, opponents 
claimed that the development would violate the law, and the courts agreed. 
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In practice, having your cake and eating it too is impossible. Someone will lose. Whether or not the 
self-designated or actual ‘losers’ should be entitled to ‘justified’ resistance must not depend on 
whether we sympathize with the opponents. Planning by sympathy is not an option. The rule of law 
must prevail in the context of democratic participatory decision-making. Planners can improve plans 
by offering many participation opportunities to those who are hostile to the project, and should also 
accept that different rationalities yield different perceptions about the problems and different 
solutions. That is, democratic decision-making needs to be polyrational. 
—I think what we are looking for here are ethical bases for claims about the context, content and 
form of resistance and imposition. I agree with Ben that planning by sympathy for a cause or a group, 
as tempting as it may be, is not an option. It is too dangerous. I think the most useful ethical bases are 
the Golden Rule (‘don’t do unto others’) and Rawls’s veil of ignorance, which implies that we should 
seek to improve the situation of those with the least choices, or, in dispute resolution language, those 
with the worst Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA). Planners should support the 
people with the least choices or the worst BATNA. For instance, the pipeline company can change the 
pipeline route, but the Standing Rock Sioux cannot move sacred land or protect the river if the 
pipeline leaks. Polluting industries can look for alternative sites or change production processes, but 
communities cannot thrive, and some people cannot survive, in heavily polluted environments.  
—We really appreciate Ben’s idea of polyrational planning, where decisions would 
build on an understanding of multiple perspectives. It would be great to see it in action (a bit like 
Ghandi’s view of western civilisation!). We also think Lucie’s suggestion to use participants’ BATNA or 
focus on those with the least choice provides helpful guidance. Democracies need processes where 
everyone affected by a decision can have a say. In the absence of polyrational planning or Veil of 
Ignorance, political interests are often laid bare.  
In Scotland, the planning system is stacked in favour of development - as opposed to social and 
environmental considerations. Often, there is little opportunity for alternative viewpoints to be heard. 
So opponents pursue legal challenges, take direct action or become political campaigners. Often, they 
are vilified, so, whether we agree with them or not, in our opinion, opponents often take very brave 
ethical stances. It is planners’ silence and lack of resistance that is perhaps a more pressing ethical 
issue.  
—We would like to add to the questions that Lucie brought up earlier about 
distinguishing between successful argumentation and co-optation, and to the topic of expressing and 
hearing multiple viewpoints and polyrationalities. In representative democracies, rules and ethics are 
powerful (and contestable) norms for practice, as well as guidance for participatory engagement. The 
law provides for diverse consultation opportunities and a situated ethical judgement must account for 
the diverse views that participants bring to them. But how are people to know what counts as legal, 
desirable, and/or valuable engagement, let alone resistance? 
We think the power of stories and story-telling is promising as a way of promoting inter-dependency 
and openness to others (Cameron, 2012, Eckstein & Throgmorton, 2003). Planning as story-telling can 
help explore what professional practice and local realities might become (van Hulst, 2012). It can 
communicate the imaginaries required for local change and adaptation, and for anticipatory reckoning 
of conflict, resistance and hard decisions (Fincher et al., 2014). So through stories shared over time 
and space, the BATNA/WATNA might reconcile personal, contextual and collective tensions. 
Stories facilitate mutual learning, enhancing our capacity to confront concerns about how, where and 
when we can reconcile highly-structured participatory norms and rules with various local needs for 
civic engagement. Stories help us navigate between instrumental, ordinary and insurgent politics in a 
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meaningful, safe and satisficing way. Like this conversation, the interlinking and weaving of planning 
stories might give us hope and traction.  
Q 3  
—Planning conflicts often lead to accusations of violence. Do planning theory and practice pay 
sufficient attention to the forms of violence involved in urban development and planning processes? 
How can we understand and navigate the relationships between violence, imposition, and resistance? 
—Let’s consider carefully what is violence. Drawing on a dictionary definition, violence is an 
‘exertion of physical force so as to injure or abuse’ and/or an ‘intense turbulent, or furious and 
destructive action of force’. Taking such a blunt definition of violence may render invisible the 
nuanced and very complex ways that violence is experienced by individuals and across society at large, 
and how it might be perpetuated through the institutions that together comprise urban planning. 
Looking to Gender Studies, and particularly the literature on violence against women, we can draw on 
the concept ‘intersectionality’ as a form of analysis to explore and understand how violence is 
conducted and how it is experienced differently across the city and over time by different actors, 
communities and neighbourhoods. The intersections between various forms of marginalisation can 
reveal how power, identity, and politics shape the performance of violence—both subtle and overt. 
To take the example of transport planning again, high profile projects such as the East West Link 
project in Melbourne have captured the attention of residents and community-based groups 
motivated to expose the violent way in which such projects are imposed. They offer little opportunity 
for careful examination of alternatives, or for public scrutiny of impacts on local residents and the city. 
But the administrative violence involved in driving through such processes may also mask other forms 
of hidden, transport-related violence, such as the day-to-day marginalisation and exclusion of parts of 
the city from jobs and services. 
—In my experience, the meaning and definition of violence, the place of violence and the concept 
‘violence’ are seldom referenced within planning theory, practice or education when it comes to 
resistance to land development and policy changes - except for the feminist, Gaia/ecological and 
ecofeminist literature. Even as we decry urban renewal, it is rarely in terms of violence. 
Yet there is obvious violence in many forms of land development. In the desecration of sacred sites, 
there is clear violence, e.g., in mountaintop removal for mining, cutting down sacred trees or 
destroying temples. One cannot destroy a sacred site ‘just a little bit’ any more than one can rape ‘just 
a little bit.’ Any damage done is total and permanent. Less visible from a Western perspective is 
violence against the elements. If water is sacred, then pasture animals defecating in streams is 
violence against the water. If air is sacred, then most cars commit acts of violence. Closer to the 
western urban experience, there is violence in demolishing historic (quasi-sacred) buildings or 
cemeteries for new development. There is thus violence against places—and the identities and 
memories attached to them—when in demolishing important community facilities or whole 
neighborhoods in the pursuit of urban growth objectives. 
—Like Lucie, we think debates in planning theory and practice are not always honest 
about the forms of violence that surround the development of land. As Crystal suggests, violence is 
not just about the exercise of physical force and can take on many forms wherever force is used to 
harm, injure or oppress. Some criminologists explore the idea of social harm, capturing the ways in 
which harms are generated and distributed in society. From this perspective, the lower life expectancy 
experienced by communities forced to live with poor air quality might be considered a form of 
violence. Yet the businesses and public decision-makers responsible for premature deaths caused by 
siting decisions are rarely held accountable before the law. 
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—Developers may talk of the violence of the unmovable resisting subject too. Tree-dwelling-
protesters, class action lawyers, ‘unreasonable’ Indigenous people, etc. impose undue burdens and 
slow ‘progress’ and ‘modernity’ by challenging and delaying projects. Opposition to immigration, 
neighborhood change or school redistricting is a different form of violence. It can be described as 
racist, conservative, NIMBY resistance. Yet, power and resource asymmetries make these non-
commensurate acts. Developers and the privileged have the choice to go elsewhere, their personal 
and community survival is not threatened by opposition, while communities and cultures absolutely 
‘need’ specific spaces, structures, sacred sites, physical manifestations of memory and identity etc. for 
their survival.  
So it appears to me that violence is ethically justified when the threat is the destruction of sacred (or 
quasi-sacred) lands or structures, and when it is undertaken by disenfranchised communities with 
limited alternatives. Yet, this is still a rather limited take on the ethics of violence, because it is devoid 
of any reflection on what is ‘good’. I think planning theory has, first, a responsibility to acknowledge 
violence but also to reflect on what is ‘good’ i.e., what maintains, restores or hinders the ability of a 
building, place, person, community or city to thrive. What diminishes this ‘good’ is violent. Ongoing 
discussions about the good, categorical imperatives and violence could radically enhance planning 
theory, practice and education. 
—There is often violence in planning processes too. Many of the individuals and 
communities Planning Democracy talk to use language that is resonant with violent metaphors to 
describe their interactions with the planning system in Scotland as variously a ‘battle’, a ‘war’, 
‘traumatic’ ‘shell-shocking’, or even like ‘being raped’. Some tell stories of vandalism and personal 
abuse as local communities fallout over development. Others report being threatened with legal 
action by developers if they object to proposals. Nearly all complain of the subtle forms of violence 
involved in just not being listened to. 
—This sounds like what Bourdieu, called symbolic violence which is what happens 
when formal planning regimes effectively deny opponents choices or the opportunities to resist by 
encouraging submission or obedience in various ways; worse still when those state regimes are the 
only avenues of recourse or final appeal this can become institutional victimization  (Gunder and 
Mouat, 2002: 124). Sadly this still too often speaks to the lost, curtailed, excluded or overwritten 
voices in many planning processes and the conventional meaning of development. This brings to mind 
the West-African proverb: Until the Story of the [Lion] hunt is told by the Lion, the tale of the hunt will 
always glorify the [human] hunter. Perhaps we need to attend more closely to the stories of the lion to 
explore how violence is experienced and might be avoided or better addressed? 
—Yes, the ‘dark side’ of civic engagement is sometimes recognized in planning theory, 
but in practice a blind eye often seems to be turned. Recognising the full-range of ways in which 
violence is involved in urban development would be a good first step towards doing something about 
it. 
—In the 1980s, Jürgen Habermas’ consensus theory of truth convinced many planning scholars—
such as John Forester, Judith Innes, or Patsy Healey—of the power of ‘violent-free discourse’ 
(gewaltfreier Diskurs). The basic idea of Habermas’ theory radiates a deep trust in rational exchange. 
Stakeholders willing to engage with each other in a discourse free of violence eventually overcome 
their differences and resolve any dispute between them. Above all, such a discourse must be free of 
‘structural violence,’ i.e., violence that does not involve guns and bombs, but institutions and rights 
and different levels of education or wealth. Consensus building, negotiated developments, 
collaborative planning are just some of the strange fruits of the consensus theory of truth. Habermas’ 
was fiercely opposed in the 1970s and 1980s, by Niklas Luhmann (2001) and his theory of the 
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legitimizing procedure (Legitimation durch Verfahren). Unfortunately, Luhmann got less attention than 
Habermas. His theory is quite compelling, however, for understanding structural violence. Examining 
civil law litigation, criminal proceedings, and administrative procedures, Luhmann concluded that the 
rules of procedure do not aim at finding truth absolute. Unlike the open-ended Habermasian 
discourse, legal procedures are structured in a way that legitimizes the outcome of said procedures 
notwithstanding their result. Procedural laws are supposed to keep the losers from ‘scratching their 
scabs’. Audiatur et altera pars—the fundamental principle of always hearing the other side—is not 
about the production of truth, but, above all, the production of awe and acceptance. 
Comparing Habermas and Luhmann, we can identify two powerful explanations of violence. To 
Habermas, violence is the entirety of forces that distort a discourse designed to look for truth. To 
Luhmann, violence is the entirety of forces that hamper procedural legitimacy from being established. 
Although the two theories could hardly contradict each other more strongly, surprisingly both yield 
similar results. A planning authority that does not conform to rules of procedure (which is sometimes 
more demanding than mere regulations) and a planning authority that denies parties the chance to 
find the truth (which is time-consuming) are both guilty of introducing undue violence into the 
planning process. 
Q  
—Resistance is often seen as a problem because it slows down new development that can be framed 
as ‘urgently’ required. How is the construction of urgency and necessity related to the politics of 
opposition? 
—Constructing a project as urgent and necessary often justifies claims of exceptionalism. The 
claim is that the project is so urgent that we (can, should, must) ‘exceptionally’ bypass democratic 
processes. The necessity of the project receives much greater credence than opponent’s rationales. 
This strategy only increases the power gap between David and Goliath. For instance, during the Global 
Financial Crisis, the Australian government pursued an aggressive ‘urgent’ infrastructure stimulus for 
social housing. The urgency was used to rationalize temporary interruptions of participatory planning 
processes, such as community notifications and third party appeal rights, even in cities with emerging 
deliberative planning practices. While this particular case delivered a form of infrastructure benefitting 
vulnerable populations, affected citizens were not provided room to mount an objection. 
—Yes, we have observed the same trends as Crystal. ‘Urgency’ and ‘crises’ are 
manufactured to justify suspending, or circumventing, established ways of doing, including democratic 
processes and oversight. We have seen it recently in Scotland, with strong pressure to streamline 
planning processes, including public participation, in the face of an urgent ‘housing crisis.’ This is used 
to justify minimizing the voices of communities that would obstruct any ‘necessary’ (and profitable) 
development. But the more important, and forgotten, context is that Scotland has failed for decades 
to build enough affordable housing. The crisis is real, but not new or urgent, and its causes are far 
more complex than is often acknowledged. There are issues that all of us would sometimes like to see 
taken out of the normal sphere of politics (effective global leadership to tackle climate change or the 
refugee crisis, anyone?). But we need to debate whose sense of urgency should be acted on and what 
the problems really are. In this case: why has the Scottish housing market consistently failed to ensure 
delivery of new and affordable homes for decades?  
—Clearly, ‘urgency’ and ‘necessity’ are obscure and obscuring categories. National security, as a 
necessity, conceals oppressive methods. Economic and political actors have widely different 
perceptions of scarcity (and urgency might be understood as a scarcity of time). When one fears 
immediate loss of jobs if development is obstructed, another fears the loss of invaluable natural 
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resources if development goes ahead. Planners have an important role to play in this ‘scarcity game’ 
(Davy, 2016: 142). They need to think in a polyrational fashion to account for widely different 
perceptions of scarcity. 
In addition, the public often learns about development projects late in the process, long after the 
incipient stage when developer and planning authorities formed their own opinions about its 
necessity. Years later, when the public hears about the project, opponents apply entirely different 
timescale and urgency standards. When they are labelled ‘irrational,’ ‘alarmist,’ or ‘irresponsible,’ this 
confirms their suspicions, and they can grow immovable. The planner, as scarcity manager, needs to 
be aware of the time gap and various timescales in the perceptions of developers, planning 
authorities, and opponents. But aligning timescales or necessity standards can look like manipulation. 
The problem is well known in the theory and practice of negotiations and consensus building. We thus 
need to allow for generous time frames to align timescales or necessity standards. 
—I am intrigued by ClareS and Andy’s call for investigating the contextual factors of ‘crisis’ 
construction and Ben’s need to investigate urgency standards. With risk of being overly simplistic, I 
would propose that the only truly urgent matters are responses to unforeseen dramatic disaster 
events, such as natural disasters, terrorist attacks or major economic recessions. In the face of these 
(rare) real urgencies, I have not observed much unmovable resistance. It seems like most people 
understand the absolute necessity to evacuate, reopen hospitals, remove damaged structures, rebuild 
and support victims. Short of these critical life-and-death situations, I think most other planning 
decisions rushed in the name of urgency are not truly urgent.   
I agree with everyone here: urgency is manufactured to generate support (and funding) and to bypass 
democratic processes for expedited and unexamined decisions. These decisions may be in the public 
interest --like the social housing built in Australia, or not. But in all cases, they help secure decisions 
that maximize the benefit of project proponents. I have seen claims of urgency used to support and 
provide public funds to developers so that they would build bigger and higher, and increase the local 
tax base. This manufactured urgency suspended public debate, rational argumentation and critical 
thinking. When urgency is used as a rationale to act fast and avoid democratic debate, planners should 
halt the process, take a breath, engage and listen to affected parties, and review claims to the public 
interest before they proceed with any permit. 
—Yes, and I would add that decisions that are sped up to meet political or proponent priorities 
typically end badly. While day-to-day planning permit applications can easily be decided within regular 
time frames, planning for major strategic plans or infrastructure development needs time for 
thorough and inclusive engagement processes. It is typically in these cases that urgency is artificially 
imposed by politicians or developers who seek to avoid scrutiny or to achieve a political objective. 
The irony is that speeding up the process usually increases resistance. This happened for instance for 
the East-West Link road and tunnel project in Melbourne: the engagement period was too short to be 
participatory, which led to considerable resistance and the project failed. Where an extensive 
community engagement process built consensus for a preferred route option (the Peninsula Link 
project a few years earlier), community concerns were managed and opposition was minimal. I agree 
with Ben’s earlier comments about the hydropower plant. Effective early resistance can improve 
outcomes. In the case of Peninsula Link, it led the proponent to take more time to develop 
relationships, build consensus on the desired outcomes, and better manage the projects’ impacts. 
—I think we need to dig deeper. We need to trace the mobilisation of urgency and think about 
how representations of crisis manufacture urgent imperatives for consent in terms of being ‘with us or 
against us.’ The emphasis is typically on speed and efficiency, but I think it would be more useful to 
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recast it as certainty and security. The forces at play are often the will to certainty and the will to 
security. Simply put, developers want certainty their development will happen as a guarantee of their 
financial security. Communities want certainty regarding their constitution, and collective-personal 
security. This conventional positioning ensures an impasse, and lacks the sophistication needed to find 
mutually agreeable – or ‘satisficing’ - options in the short or longer term. 
Recasting the capitalistic logic of speed into the will to security and certainty might shed light onto the 
politics of intractability in conventional development and planning. Nietzsche, and later Jean-Luc 
Nancy, wrestled with the dilemmas and uncertainties that lie hidden beneath all seemingly rational 
and instrumental social codes. Arguably, speed and efficiency are good examples of such codes. But 
the rationality of conventional planning-as-development often frustrates recognition of deeper issues 
and mutual social learning towards just and sustainable outcomes. The strength of tactics of urgency 
are thus illusory. The fast, ‘clear and distinct’ communication that they claim is ‘merely an expression 
of the will to truth; the will to control and dominate the world’ (Glenn, 2004: 577). 
In this perspective, what appears to be strong is in fact a weakness. Instead of strength emanating 
from certainty, we can imagine strength emanating from the uncertainties of difference and splintered 
urban living. I agree with Gleeson (2000: 129) that ‘[t]his means the reinstatement of uncertainty as a 
value for planning and the cultivation of a critical self-awareness that would immunize the profession 
against the virus of excessive rationalization’. Or, as Soja (2000: 11-12) says, ‘perfect or complete 
knowledge is impossible. There is too much that lies beneath the surface, unknown and perhaps 
unknowable (…) the best we can do is selectively explore (…) the infinite complexity of life through its 
intrinsic spatial, social, and historical dimension, its interrelated spatiality, sociality, and historicality’. 
So, really, I think that so-called ‘urgency,’ which is really a will to certainty and security, implies a 
singular truth/knowledge that is politically suspect. I would champion instead the use of slowly and 
carefully told stories about complex, uncertain and splintered differences, as convivial modes of 
encounter in renegotiating good governance. 
.—It seems like we all agree on this topic. With some exceptions, urgency and crises are 
manufactured to limit democratic decision-making processes. They are used to the benefit of (public 
and private) pro-development interests and generate distrust that motivates immovable opposition. 
Rationalizing and fast-tracking development weakens not only democratic participatory processes, but 
also our ability to see reality in all its uncertain and unknowable complexity. Worse, it weakens our 
collective ability for mutual learning and for moving towards just and sustainable outcomes. 
Q 5   
.—What, if any, alternatives can we imagine for governing (or accommodating) resistance, including 
immoveable resistance, in democratic and just ways?  
—Alternatives are hard, partly because they’ve got to be so much wider than 
planning. Our political, legal and economic systems are all in need of radical change. Current models of 
democracy don’t deliver justice for the environment or the vulnerable in society. 
As part of a wider set of changes, we need to rethink planning entirely too: stop seeing it as a technical 
procedural system, and repackage it as a way of determining the future of society. When the focus is 
on procedural trivia, underlying principles are too often forgotten. To do this we may need to start 
rebadging planning, getting beyond its current negative connotations. At the very least, we should 
incorporate real listening exercises. 
—I agree with the importance of active listening. Prevailing Habermasian-based ideas about 
deliberative democracy are often invoked within systems that are not designed for rich participative 
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democracy. Mutual learning, human flourishing and rich engagement with others are at odds with the 
push for efficient development within highly-regulated and codified systems. We need to listen, but 
also build better systems of governance that support that listening. As an alternative I would 
emphasise the role of time and resources in building capacity and trust for residents and affected 
communities to mutually learn how to participate in the governance of cities. 
—I very much agree on the importance of listening too: real listening or active listening (Forester, 
1989, 155). However, everybody who is listened to must understand that listening to somebody does 
not mean that the listener will be persuaded by what she hears. Listeners are not necessarily 
followers. So, what else but listening may direct a democratic and just path? 
This conversation is confirming my suspicion that planners give up on the rule of law too easily. 
Depending on each country’s planning system, the planning law or land use law defines goals and 
procedures for ascertaining whether a proposed development may obtain a planning permission or 
not. A good way to deal with resistance is to convince the opponents that a planning permission 
complies with the law. 
—But the law is often too late, too expensive, too remote and frankly too biased 
towards the interests of private property. 
—Quite. By legality, I do not mean that developers use every possible loophole in the planning law 
and employ an army of lawyers to find creative ways to circumvent the law. Rather, by legality I mean 
that a development has been planned carefully and considerately with a view to the democratically 
legitimized goals and procedures of planning law. A planning authority must be grateful to opponents 
if they help putting a proposed development to the test of legality. In my comparative work, I have 
noticed over the past years that many planning laws worldwide have been either watered down or 
grown incomprehensible. I can understand why opponents of a proposed development, might not be 
convinced that a development is legal (either because the law is obscure, or because it is 
circumvented). There are different methods for planning authorities to share their reasons for 
granting a planning permission. Sadly, even well-meaning efforts to communicate legal information 
can often look rather clumsy and bureaucratic. 
— I think Ben is quite correct here – much planning law and policy is too open to interpretation to 
be effectively used for resistance. I have worked on several projects where demonstrating social 
impact is not enough to get a project stopped or altered. For example, in Victoria, the only Act they 
consider is the Planning and Environment Act. So you can prove that a proposal is contrary to the 
public health goals of the Public Health and Wellbeing Act, but that’s irrelevant. The social matters 
that can be addressed are very narrowly defined, and have been narrowed even further through 
various cases brought before the courts. Effective opposition in that arena means figuring out how to 
speak their language and frame your opposition in terms that they can actually legally respond to. 
—Habermas’ (1996) book Between facts and norms provides a useful framework to reflect 
further on the relationship between planning as a ‘legislated’ practice and planning as a social and 
political construct. The rigidity of planning legislation cements a certain ethos and process which can 
often be subject to manipulation by political elites. At other times, legislation is either too weak or 
simply dismissed and therefore, not enforced. 
If urban governance can be so easily manipulated and compromised by power relations, the role that 
planning needs to play to ‘manage power’ is considerable (and has been the subject of communicative 
and collaborative planning scholarship for thirty years now). However, foregrounding questions about 
a social and environmental ethics in planning and how the public interest might be articulated, 
represented and then employed as a decision guide, opens up a space to explore more critically and 
	 14	
carefully the relationship between planners (the bureaucratic tier of government) and the political 
tier. The extent to which the social and ethical advice offered by planners is adhered to by political 
decision makers is a question worth further investigation. 
—In the face of ethically justified immovable resistance (justified based on a veil of ignorance, 
worst BATNA, or other criteria protecting the most vulnerable and non-negotiable rights to physical 
and socio-cultural life and identity), I think planning—and, ideally, the law—should back the 
resistance. What that would mean is that if any action is so damaging to anyone or any group that 
affected people/groups organize ethically justified immovable resistance, then the action should be 
halted. For example, if indigenous people consider that a new pipeline will desecrate their sacred land, 
and they see no compromise as acceptable, then the pipeline should be re-routed away from this 
territory. The questions becomes: on what grounds could a minority have veto power over public or 
private action in a democratic system?  
—And what are the responsibilities of planners and public officials in dealing with immovable 
opposition? 
—To return to Habermas’s facts and norms; while facts present their own challenges with respect 
to their fixity, norms often become manifest through pluralistic and agonistic struggle over power; 
who wields it and who can leverage it to serve particular ends.  When development proposals are 
overturned it is often in the shadow of a contested election where the forces of resistance step 
outside of formal governance and planning decision processes, to act politically. Through careful 
tactics and strategic engagement they can wield the power needed to stop projects at the ballot box. 
What role planners might play in these ‘informal’ spaces, where norms get reshaped, should also be of 
interest. 
—I still wonder if there is really such a thing as immovable resistance? There are certain non-
negotiables that are either protected in legislation or policy: for example, human rights or 
environmental protection. In many planning cases there are other non-negotiables based on technical 
or scientific considerations: for example, the majority of decision factors for sewerage infrastructure 
relate to the physics and cost of moving and treating wastewater, not to how people feel about living 
near a treatment plant. In day-to-day planning practice, those are the issues that matter. 
The responsibility for planners and public officials is to develop and implement transparent and just 
governance processes which ensure that all considerations are appropriately included in the decision-
making process. We still have a long way to go in developing assessment processes which adequately 
incorporate community opinion and objections. This is at least partly because objections are often 
poorly articulated and hence easily discounted, but also partly because decision-making processes are 
generally weighted in favour of the project proponent. But since opposition is often based on a 
perception or reality of unfairness or unjust outcomes, planners should be working towards ways to 
improve the justice of the decision-making framework they work within. 
—I would argue that many of what Ruth calls ‘non-negotiables’ are not protected by legislation or 
policy (e.g., in the areas of pollution, institutional violence or poverty).  Laws, planning, democracies 
have the absolute obligation to protect the things that lie in the domain of the sacred (as defined by 
the people/groups who hold such things sacred). In a similar way, we could argue that they have the 
absolute obligation to protect the most vulnerable. Actions that harm the most vulnerable, poorest, 
most disenfranchised people to the point that they (even as a minority) organize immovable 
resistance, should be halted. 
I understand that this principle is difficult to apply: I would argue that the test should be the presence 
or absence of choice. A sacred site (indigenous or western, tree, river, church or graveyard) is at least 
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in part sacred due to its prolonged history in place. It cannot be moved elsewhere. If there is no choice 
other than protect or destroy, then we should protect. Society already has these types of protection 
(absolute ‘do no harm’ policies) for those who have the least choice, such as children, pregnant 
women or people with disabilities. It seems theoretically possible to extend the absolute protection 
we accord these groups to other people, places and natural elements. 
—If I could propose only one change to make significant and on-going impact, it would be to find 
ways of more effectively sharing stories and just listening to what matters to others (what is sacred to 
them in Lucie’s terms). One specific example that I have discovered in research into child-friendly city 
planning and promoting urban intensification is the powerful effectiveness of trust champions as 
(quasi)independent community actors. These actors must be carefully recruited and nurtured; 
although unfortunately they are often the first to go as budgets and priorities change. One 
responsibility of planners, publics, and decision-makers might be to identify and protect such 
champions whose role is to work directly with communities, and coordinate across the silos that 
frequently characterise how government agencies and developers interact with different publics. 
—This comes back to planners being community enablers rather than development 
enablers. Instead of feeling threatened by opposing communities, they should see opposition as an 
opportunity to improve how we plan and develop places. Planners need to explore ways of enabling 
real engagement and ensuring real equality in planning if they are going to overcome people’s wider 
distrust of politicians and public officials. As a minimum, the responsibilities of planners must involve 
preventing people from feeling emotionally traumatised (as people we speak to frequently seem to). 
So when folk are talking about violence, we need to find ways of acknowledging that the impacts of 
planning systems can be huge, ensure that they are well-managed and that people’s deeply felt 
concerns are fully represented. 
—I have often encountered this issue of people feeling traumatized too – and it is often the 
planning process itself that creates the trauma, not so much the subsequent project. This is well 
known in social impact assessment literature –for example Rabel Burdge listed this as one of the key 
social impact assessment variables in his book The Concepts, Process and Methods of Social Impact 
Assessment (2004) 
Q 6  
—What do you think are the responsibilities of resisting subjects? 
—In Scotland, we have a tendency to bemoan opposition to development and label it 
as misinformed NIMBY-ism. Some planners talk in patronising terms about communities that need to 
‘be educated’ or have their expectations ‘managed.’ Clare has observed cases where offering 
community support is labelled ‘touchy feely stuff,’ as opposed to the serious business of enabling 
development. And professionals frequently point to opposition’s failure to frame arguments in the 
language and rationality of legal and policy frameworks. We haven’t seen too much concern about 
whether it is reasonable to expect opponents to talk in these languages in the first place. 
Instead we need to find ways to judge what makes resistance responsible or irresponsible. Like George 
Bernard Shaw said: progress often depends on people being unreasonable - even more so when the 
powerful define what ‘reasonable’ means! If pollution, road traffic accidents and climate change kill 
people, is it not reasonable to expect extreme resistance? But of course, opposition must be subjected 
to some kind of test to decide whether it is proportionate and ethical. The firebombing of refugee 
camps mentioned by Ben certainly doesn’t seem ethically justified. But between firebombing and 
doing what we’re told, a wide range of modes of resistance are perfectly responsible, sometimes even 
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if resistance is condemned by the legal system. One key test that hasn’t yet been considered is the 
extent to which opponents engage with the wider implications of their local planning struggles, i.e., 
when NIMBY is transformed into Not In Anyone’s Back Yard (NIABY). Some of the most responsible 
resistance is motivated by wider concerns. But this isn’t a universal rule. For some, intense 
attachments to particular places justifies extended resistance.  
—I agree, but the relations between NIMBY and NIABY are complex: they can coexist. I am 
thinking about the case of transport planning in Melbourne. The proposal to build major inner city 
freeways involved two types of resistance. For residents along the proposed project corridor who risk 
losing their homes, resistance might be interpreted as NIMBY. These resisting forces were sometimes 
joined by groups that sit beyond the affected project corridor, such as public transport advocacy 
groups and other coalitions resisting freeway developments and increased car dependency. These 
networks or coalitions question the structural, institutional and political arrangements that privilege 
freeways as urban mobility solutions. They build on a broader shift in policy frameworks towards 
public and active transport modes.   
These two groupings of resistance—direct action/NIMBY and coalition formation/NIABY—shed light 
on a complex landscape of resisting forces. Some resist because the stakes for them are high (e.g. lose 
a home). Some resist because the stakes for the city or the planet are high (e.g. sustainable urban 
mobility, climate change). The coalition may ‘lose’ the fight against a specific freeway proposal, but 
may successfully shift the discourse and maybe even future investments towards public transport for 
long-term change. 
—Like we said, some, but not all, responsible resistance is motivated by wider 
altruistic concerns. For Planning Democracy, responsible citizens actively challenge established ways-
of-doing for the betterment of all of society. This requires courage, conviction and tenacity. We need 
to remember that resistance can be hugely stressful for those involved, and we should therefore 
assess people’s responses with real care, even when we disagree passionately with their position. 
—I completely agree. Immovable resistance is extremely costly to participants. They bear these 
costs in the hope of greater rewards, and because everything has failed. Immovable subjects, I would 
argue, probably have already learnt that sanctioned political activities (participation, lawsuits, 
petitions, electoral politics) fail to advance their cause - otherwise why resort to the hardship of 
immovability? 
When immovable resistance places itself outside existing direct and indirect democratic procedures 
for collective decision-making, it bears the burden of justifying this refusal of existing procedures. The 
fact that the laws and policies fail to support their cause is obviously not enough. I can think of several 
ethically valid rationales. First, negotiation or collaboration with (real or perceived) enemies, 
dictatorships or terrorist entities may be morally absolutely unacceptable. Second, negotiation and 
collaboration may present high risks and quasi-null probabilities of positive outcomes. This can happen 
if project opponents have minimal resources compared to developers or governments, or if all 
attempts to collaborate or be heard have failed. For instance, chaining yourselves to a tree after 
logging has been permitted is an ethically valid immovable position because logging companies have 
no incentive to negotiate since their operations have already been approved by the judicial system. 
Third, I also think immovable resistance is justified if the stakes are a matter of physical or cultural 
survival, e.g., for the protection of public health, sacred, historic or otherwise unique sites. In this case 
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immovability is justified because only a complete win (protecting health, the site or the tree) satisfies 
the absolute need for survival. 
—I think the concept of insurgent citizenship, popularized in planning by John Friedmann, is very 
useful here (2002: 75–78; 2011). He compiled a list of ‘principles of insurgent practice’ (Friedmann, 
2002: 83–84). Among these principles are: threat to the survival of specific groups, resistance to the 
denial of autonomy, and a simultaneous consideration of the grand and the tiny. This outlines quite 
well the responsibilities of immoveable subjects, and is very much in line with what ClareM, ClareS and 
Andy and Lucie have proposed so far. 
I do see some danger, however, to romanticizing insurgent practices because Robin Hood is more 
lovable than the Sheriff of Nottingham. Insurgent practices comprise violence, xenophobia, ultra-
nationalism etc. Having said this, I still think insurgent citizenship can help us define the rights and 
duties of opponents to a planned development. It makes clear from the beginning that the 
immoveable subjects should contextualize themselves within a set of values that lay out the rights and 
duties of citizenship. Developers and planning authorities don’t have to agree with these values, but 
recognizing them is much more beneficial than calling opponents irrational or irresponsible. 
Second, insurgent citizenship is not meant to be a handmaiden of the planning authority, or reducible 
to being merely an audience in a well-designed public participation meeting. ClareS and Andy concur 
that the firebombing of refugee camps is not a reasonable response to the siting of refugee centers (in 
Germany or other EU countries). I feel a bit ambiguous about my sad example and their agreement. 
Let us not forget the truism about terrorists and freedom fighters: one person’s immoveable subject is 
another’s celebrated hero. Gandhi and Mandela—two wonderful examples of insurgent citizens—
were considered lawbreakers and terrorists at various moments of their lives. I certainly hope that the 
arsonists who attacked refugee centers will never be celebrated as freedom fighters. But considering 
the hate, anxiety, and xenophobia spreading throughout Europe and the United States in 2015-16, I 
cannot be sure. 
—I would like to address the question from a different perspective. If we seek a universal 
responsibility of the subject, we might accept that ‘the price of liberty is eternal vigilance’ (attributed 
to John Philpot Curran, 1790). However, we must also distinguish the complex variability of how, 
where, and by/for whom this vigilance is manifest, and variable expressions of subject responsibility 
over time and space. 
— Yes, and I would further expand the definition of ‘eternal vigilance’ to include active participation 
at higher levels of policy and planning, not just opposition to local projects. Too often the reason for 
resistance is that the policy and legislative framework does not accurately reflect the values and 
aspirations of community members, and they do not realise this until it is too late. Citizens of modern 
plural democracies cannot rely on representative democratic processes to effectively manage every 
single issue: they must take responsibility for the system. Practically, that means that Planning needs 
to move towards new models of citizen engagement, including empowering processes such as 
citizens’ juries and deliberative democracy, which offer opportunities for diverse and conflicting 
community members to interface more powerfully with bureaucracy and for mutual learning at that 
interface. 
—How about this final question: How can we mobilise mutual learning opportunities at the 
interfaces where irresistible forces meet immoveable subjects? 
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—First, I think that we must acknowledge that fear of negative outcomes drives both resistance 
and counter-resistance. Evermore escalated today, we must respond to fear-mongering and 
misinformation by supporting learning opportunities within situations that build strategic capacity 
founded on community dynamics (recognising the interdependence of people around us). Our 
challenge is to create moments, places and spaces for engaging in mutual learning as a democratic 
dynamic based on human flourishing (as Patsy Healey termed it at a recent UK-Ireland Planning 
conference plenary). We must also prudently embrace the messy chiaroscuro of everyday planning 
and contested and co-existing meanings (Hillier, 2002: 17). This is difficult and requires much humility 
and humanity. 
—You may think I’m cynical, but in the face of irresistible capitalistic development forces, or 
totalitarian forces, I would argue that not much mutual learning can occur. Mutual learning requires 
that we are interested in each-others’ perspectives and in finding mutually agreeable solutions. But 
irresistible development forces are rarely genuinely interested in mutually agreeable solutions, and 
even less about listening to the polyrational stories of opponents. They may protect some open space 
or build less high, but development will happen. The pipeline will go through. Symmetrically, if 
opposition is opposition to any development, then there is no win-win solution, opposition can only 
win or lose. So I’m not sure how situations of irresistible development forces and immovable 
resistance can be suited for mutual learning. 
—I am more optimistic! To mobilise mutual learning opportunities I would propose a blending of 
the human capacity approach (advocated by the UN, Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen) with bell 
hook's ‘yearning’ for community – seeking to develop more powerful narratives of interdependent 
learning. Wendy Sarkissian's (2008) kitchen table provides examples of places and times where 
narratives/stories can be shared to make sense of the confounding responsibilities and trade-offs of 
intractable situations.  
—And perhaps, as long as developers rely on a socially mandated ‘license’ to operate through 
planning, there is some scope to build recognition that they too need to be part of such conversations 
rather than simply falling back on power games. 
—Ideally, we would develop strong communities through yearning using ‘an affective and 
political sensibility’ that accepts the necessary ‘cross-category ties that ‘promote the recognition of 
common commitments and serve as a base for solidarity and coalition’’ (bell hooks 1990 in Haraway, 
1997: 191). This is not an end-state, but rather that seeing planning as the ‘organisation of hope’ 
(Baum, 1997) might help us bear sad tales and yet still galvanise solidarity and humanity. 
 
In drawing the discussion to a close we do not want to suggest that any hard and fast conclusions can be 
drawn from this open-ended and experimental interaction. However, as editors we do want to offer some 
thoughts about what we take to be some of the key themes to have emerged, and what might be learned 
from them. 
Our conversation has been conducted across a variety of geographical contexts in the Global North, 
drawing on cases from Austria, Australia, Germany, New Zealand, Scotland and the US. It has also 
included planning practitioner and campaigner perspectives, looking to bring these into productive 
conversation with more academic voices, and sometimes highly normative theoretical debates about how 
conflict and opposition should be understood and valued in planning. The cases and experiences we draw 
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from highlight that resistance to urban development remains an often-intractable challenge for planning. 
They also reveal striking levels of commonality in experience and sentiment: drawing attention to the 
violence of process as well as outcome that often characterises urban development; and how the 
imperative of development is constructed as an urgent necessity; frequently privileging projects over 
people and, too often, that which they hold sacred. However, the discussion has also explored the 
ambivalences of opposition, highlighting how opposition might be variously heroic, valuable, helpful, 
disruptive, or harmful for those directly involved, and for shaping urban change that has significant wider 
impacts for others whose voices may not be heard at all. 
Exploring the meanings of resistance to urban development helps open up new perspectives on the 
politics of planning and the normative promises of planning theory. Understanding the variety and 
complexity of resistance to urban development, however, illustrates how difficult it is to offer any 
concrete guidance about how planning should approach the subject of opposition: instead we are in what 
Schön (1983: 42) called the ‘swampy lowlands’, where we recognise violence and harm are being 
produced, perpetrated and distributed in urban development even as positive public goods may be 
generated. 
Though we must exercise judgement about where our sympathies lie and what forms of action they 
justify, there is a general feeling that societies cannot or should not plan by sympathy. Rather they should 
promote principles or rules that enable fair and care-full treatment for all. Lucie Laurian is prominent in 
seeking ethical rules that might guide planners in their choices: thou shalt take sides with the 
preservation of that which is sacred and those who have least choice. Given the historically intimate 
interrelations between coercion, desecration and urban development, these are radical and challenging 
principles that strikingly question ‘business as usual’ models of planning. 
Ben Davy looks elsewhere. Wondering if we might vest faith in the rule of law: seeing value in 
oppositional challenges but trusting that due process can in some sense lead us towards their resolution. 
Crystal Legacy too wonders if we might not see a professionalised bureaucracy as a bulwark against the 
politically legitimated violence that is often founded on the construction of urgency and an 
exceptionalism that tries to justify the circumventing of democratic procedure. Both therefore suggest 
that rules for resolving disputes might be, to some extent, institutionalised. Neither, however, argues that 
this can be done naively. The evidence of planning and legal systems complicity in violence and the 
perpetuation of injustices, and their tendency to be captured or circumvented by powerful developer or 
political interests are all too clear for that. As the title of Andy Wightman’s 2010 book on land-ownership 
in Scotland makes clear: ‘The Poor Had No Lawyers’. 
In acknowledging the direct and indirect violence and victimisation that inattention, carelessness or 
systematic, post-political foreclosure of democratic debate can give rise to, we are also agreed that 
planning, if not planners themselves, must strive to become poly-rational, capable of listening actively 
and seeing things from all sides, ensuring that issues of concern are acknowledged and fully considered. 
The conversation therefore resonates with much of the project of communicative planning, and its 
insights into the value of listening and communication, yet the discussion also reveals an uneasiness with 
any declaration of the potential for forging agreements in the face of deep-seated legal, political and 
social inequalities. We therefore see the conversation as part of a wider ongoing discussion about the 
responsibility of planning actors (be they professionals, citizens, lawyers, or politicians), where: ‘… a way 
forward might be for spatial planning practitioners to think about their own environmental and social 
practices; whom and what they affect, where and how, and to attempt to stretch their horizons of space 
and time to incorporate more distant others’ (Gunder and Hillier, 2007).  In the image of the poly-rational 
we perhaps glimpse the possibility of a utopian planning that has yet to come: where planners are 
enablers of community rather than development and all that is sacred is no longer profaned. In the 
	 20	
meantime, the prospects for poly-rationality will often rest on the vigilance, tenacity and political 
ambiguities of oppositional mobilisation. 
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The questions below are intended as prompts or points of departure for discussion. The editors 
acknowledge that in places they are a little ‘loaded’. Contributors will be free to either take them at face 
value, challenge their premises, or reframe them if they want. 
1. We start from the premise that contemporary planning theory still struggles to make sense of the 
ambiguous political challenges posed by the subject of opposition. Dominant theoretical debates about 
the merits of consensus or conflict highlight the problem. If opponents are often immovable, movement 
is precisely what those who would promote mediation, agreement, accommodation (or even 
compromise) require. But others argue that moves towards agreement entail a closing down of political 
spaces and of the energies and identities that drive opposition. Do you agree with this starting position 
and where do you stand in relation to these debates? 
2. If we accept that planning frequently requires ‘situated ethical judgements’ and may well be an 
exercise in distributing ‘essential injustices’ we are still left with the twin challenges of determining A. 
when resistance is justified and when it isn’t, and B. when imposition is justified to overcome resistance 
and when it isn’t? How might this be done? 
3. Planning conflicts often lead to accusations of violence on both sides. Do planning theory and practice 
pay sufficient attention to the forms of violence involved in urban development and planning processes? 
How can we understand and navigate the relationships between violence, imposition, and resistance? 
4. Resistance is often seen as a problem because it slows down urgently required new development and 
prevents change that is needed in the public interest. How do you understand the issue of speed, the 
construction of both urgency and necessity and their relationship to the politics of opposition? 
5. What, if any, alternatives can we imagine for governing (or accommodating) resistance, including 
immoveable resistance, in democratic and just ways? What are the responsibilities of planners and public 
officials working for, against or between irresistible forces and immoveable subjects? 
6. What are the responsibilities of subjects who resist (individually or collectively)? How might we 
mobilise mutual learning opportunities at the interfaces where irresistible forces meet immoveable 
subjects? 
 
